An Ethnographic View:
Positive Consequences of the War on Poverty

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Abstract: Life history data from Coast Salish tribes of Washington state reveal that federal War on Poverty programs produced important results that routine analysis has failed to uncover. The Comprehensive Training and Employment Act and the Indian Community Action Project provided income that enabled family networks to serve as centers of moral and financial support for members engaged in therapeutic work and provided training opportunities for a generation of leaders who are now instrumental in attracting funding for mental health programs.

Hidden among the ruins of the federal War on Poverty of the 1960s and 1970s are important contributions to the mental health of Indian people. These contributions are largely unrecognized because they were not anticipated in the writing of the legislation that established the War on Poverty and therefore are not considered in program analysis. I argue that specific federal War on Poverty programs have created conditions encouraging the mental health of the membership of Indian communities in two main ways. The programs have provided vital income that has been distributed through family networks, thereby helping these networks to continue to function as centers of financial, practical, and moral support for members engaged in therapeutic ceremonial work. In addition, a generation of tribal leaders received training and opportunities through War on Poverty programs. Today these leaders are instrumental in attracting funding for a range of programs that help Indian people and communities dealing with the stress of biculturalism and the accompanying high death rate caused by suicide, alcoholism, accidents, substance abuse, and violence (Guilmet & Whited, 1989).

Coast Salish Indian people live in a particularly stressful environment and experience high levels of stress, distress, and anxiety. There is a certain irony in this as Guilmet et al. (1989) point out. While the Indian Health Service (IHS) and other medical services have gained control of easily managed health conditions, mental health services for chronic, debilitating problems continue to be underfunded and are actually losing ground. This makes programs that promote Indian traditional institutions with a therapeutic role and new tribal institutions that provide mental health care services all the more important.

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It is not the intent here to make the case that Indian communities have important mental health needs, or even that traditional curers and ceremonial leaders have a significant role in promoting tribal mental health. These points are documented adequately elsewhere. Guilmet et al. (1989), Jilek (1982), Amoss (1978), and Slagle and Weibel-Orlando (1986) have written about the Coast Salish of Washington State, and the IHS itself has documented the seriousness of mental health issues and the role of traditional people (Report of Portland Area Office, 1986), as have the tribes themselves (for example, Crume, 1988).

Rather, this paper focuses on the contributions of federally funded programs and the ramifications they have in Indian communities. Life history data from leaders of a Coast Salish Tribe (identified as “A”) and from other small Puget Sound tribes are used in order to clarify the implications of the federal funding for the leaders and their tribes. My own fieldwork, 1986-1988, and interviews with leaders from other tribes, help place the life histories in the context of the tribal social organization and the events of that period. A brief discussion of the federal War on Poverty and the subsequent analyses of two of the constituent programs, Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) and Indian Community Action Projects (ICAP) suggests why the important contributions of these programs are overlooked.

War on Poverty Programs

The positive consequences of otherwise poorly regarded federal programs have gone unnoticed because they are not easily quantifiable (Levitan & Taggart, 1977), because program assessments have relied on macroeconomic analyzes, and because evaluation of programs over a life cycle has been too expensive (Levin, 1977). Furthermore, because politicians, the public, and professional researchers have generally written off the War on Poverty programs as at best of marginal benefit given the costs (Bullock, Anderson, & Brady, 1983) the benefits to Indian communities are unexpected. A detailed ethnographic examination is necessary to uncover the results of these federal programs; enough time has now elapsed to clearly show the results.

The picture of federal War on Poverty programs on Indian reservations is muddied for reasons in addition to the ones mentioned. In some cases, internal struggles on reservations over the hiring of personnel and use of funds, and competition and distrust between tribes have clouded the record of CETA (which lasted from 1973-1982), and the ICAP (1964-1970). One American Indian newspaper, Wassaja (1979) reported that “Applicants for CETA jobs are often accepted on a 'political basis,' ... and power struggles occur within tribal CETA administrations, and such is the case among the Navajo.”

A detailed study of the Fort Yuma Reservation (Bee, 1969) documented the difficulties in implementing War on Poverty programs,
including ICAP, because of internal authority struggles and the concentration of authority in too few hands. In addition, several tribes in the Northwest and perhaps elsewhere failed to participate in programs such as ICAP because of distrust of the federal government and other tribes with whom they would have to cooperate (Jefferson, personal communication, see Note 1). In addition, the American Indian Policy Review Commission (1976) reported that "Training under CETA has, according to many prime sponsors, been hampered by the lack of technical assistance provided by the Department of Labor and by limitations on the consulting services which may be contracted for by prime sponsors."

However, War on Poverty funds, especially those provided by CETA and ICAP, have contributed significantly to the ability of several small tribes of western Washington State to enhance tribal sovereignty by providing training opportunities to people who eventually became the tribal leaders of the 1980s. The skills these leaders gained have helped their tribes develop the sophistication necessary to compete for grants, to operate successful health clinics, to manage natural resources, and to protect tribal interests through difficult periods of "soft" grant money in the middle and late 1980s (Robbins, 1986). Simply put, the leaders produced by these programs take primary responsibility for the delivery of health care and other services in the 1980s and in the present. It is notable that most of these leaders are women, and indeed CETA funds provided an "opportunity structure" for Indian women that has had a significant impact on tribal social organization. It is perhaps worth speculating, as several of these leaders have done, that the ending of these programs has eliminated an important source of leaders for the future.

The CETA and ICAP programs have been selected for special examination, but this is not to suggest that other programs did not have important impact in the Indian communities. These two programs have been selected for examination in part because they are unusual in that tribes and Indian organizations developed their own programs that helped promote tribal sovereignty. Jones (1982) noted "For the first time in the history of Federal employment and training programs, Native Americans have their own set of regulations, i.e., designed with their input and with their special problems in mind." The American Indian Policy Review Commission (1976) held that "The two major programs in which Indian Control is significant are the Indian Action Teams and programs under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973."

Barsh and Diaz-Knauf (1984) wrote, "Indian CETA, which in FY-1980 accounted for one-fourth of all subsidized reservation jobs, was structured on the assumption that there would be no reservation economic growth, and therefore no point in providing Indians with marketable skills." While this may well have been the perspective of the federal government, the skills gained by men and women in the CETA program have proven to be useful as seed money and not just as income transfer. Furthermore, the training programs helped open the vision of these women to the possibilities
for their own careers, and many moved into vocational institutes, community colleges, and universities for job training following these periods of employment.

War on Poverty Programs and Assessment

Haveman (1987) wrote that the early 1960s were marked by a concern for problems of poverty and disparities between the health, income, and opportunities of Anglos and minorities. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson proposed and attempted to carry out the creation of a "Great Society," and Johnson clearly intended Indians to be part of this social initiative (Prucha, 1984). A flood of new programs aimed at the poor were developed to supplement or replace older programs. "These efforts were undertaken with optimism that poverty could be reduced, racial inequalities diminished, and efficient investments in human productivity made" (p. 65).

The new programs attempted to address social problems from a variety of angles so that a wide range of needy would benefit. Some programs, such as the Youth Conservation Corps, provided little structured training and simply placed workers in entry-level, low-paying jobs. A second sort of program included the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA), which was aimed primarily at the poor and provided classroom and on-the-job training. Another program of the second sort, Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS), reimbursed businesses that trained disadvantaged workers. A third type of program allowed the poor to participate in developing programs for themselves. The Indian Community Action Program, administered under the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), although initially designed to coordinate public and private efforts aimed at benefitting the poor, came to be a community directed program, and was oriented to increasing the political participation of minorities previously excluded from political life (Bullock et al., 1983). The MDTA, JOBS, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and Operation Mainstream all were superseded in 1973 by CETA and were substantially reduced in funding under President Reagan before being eliminated or replaced.

Education, training, and employment programs were not new to Indian reservations in the 1960s, and War on Poverty programs, in some cases, merged with older federal programs. In 1956, Public Law 959, the Indian Vocational Training Act, provided vocational training and employment opportunities for Indians ages 18 to 35. Three and one-half million dollars were provided to fund the program in 1956, and the figure increased to $25 million by 1968 (Tyler, 1973). The Industrial and Commercial Development Program (ICDP) established in 1955 allowed the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to provide tribes with grants for public works and facility development to improve opportunities for long-term employment. The OEO, established in 1964 during the War on Poverty, provided funding for ICDP loans and grants for community development.
and employment. Altogether, from 1961 to 1971 the BIA had four types of programs aimed at Indian unemployment: adult vocational training; voluntary relocation for employment; public works projects on reservations; "force accounts" construction projects; and industrial development projects on or near reservations (Fay, 1976).

The effects of the various programs on Indian communities are disputed. One macroeconomic analysis (Sorkin, 1971) examined three aspects of manpower development: direct relocation, on the job training, and adult vocational training programs. Sorkin concluded that "...measured by benefit-cost ratios at current programs levels, all three of the employment programs for Indians are relatively efficient compared with similar programs for non-Indians; apparently on the job training is somewhat more efficient than the other two. However, because present programs may have skimmed off the most promising trainees...the analysis should not be used to establish priorities for program expansion" (p. 115). Sorkin showed that from 1963 to 1967, the unemployment rates for those entering MDTA, the predecessor to CETA, dropped from 85.2% to 20% two to three years after leaving the program.

However, Sorkin (1971) also noted that, "For the on-the-job training programs, the most fundamental criticism is that a high proportion of women are enrolled, while males and nominal heads of households remain unemployed." For Sorkin, the advantage of decreasing the enrollment of single women in vocational training would be that it would increase the benefit-cost ratio. My own work (Miller, 1989a) suggests this is not a disadvantage in that the employment of women has a community-wide benefit, including providing children and youth with stable households and positive female role models.

Sorkin's findings on Indian reservations during the heyday of the War on Poverty, 1971, are in sharp contrast to both the findings of Barsh et al. (1984) 13 years later and the findings of other analysts concerning similar War on Poverty programs for non-Indians. Concerning the decade of the 1970s, Barsh et al. wrote:

> Federal taxpayers may spend more, nominally, on each Indian than they do on other Americans, but the permanent benefits to reservation communities have been smaller. One fifth of all spending maintains federal agencies, and local aid is often channelled through State agencies. Much federal 'Indian' spending therefore supports non-Indian administration away from the reservations, and poor Indian communities have been a financial windfall for some State and State subdivisions. Funds that do reach the reservations tend to be absorbed by tribal administration and unproductive public employment, with little or no stimulus to private-sector activities (p. 1).
Barsh et al. further noted that federal investments in Indian programs are unproductive because they emphasize temporary employment, bureaucracy, paperwork, and poor economic development strategies. As an example of the unproductivity of federal programs, the authors point to Indian CETA funding: "Although the Department of Labor proudly boasted about the low (0.7%) federal overhead of Indian CETA funding a few years ago, sixteen percent of Indian CETA paid for tribal administrators" (p. 14). Overall, the authors found the government programs directed at Indians to be incompetent and ineffective.

Morris (1988), taking a different view, complained about Reagan administration Indian policy, which he described as "termination by accountants," and decried what he felt was an abrogation of the federal trust responsibility. In 1982 the Reagan administration proposed the total elimination of Title II and Title VI, the public service employment portions of CETA, which would have meant the loss of an estimated 10,000 on-reservation Indian jobs (ibid.). Instead, Congress created the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 (JTPA) to replace CETA, with 25% of funds allocated on the basis of the number of unemployed Indians in the area and the remainder allocated on the basis of the number of Indians who meet the poverty criteria. In addition, the Administration for Native Americans (ANA) was established in part to promote economic and social self-sufficiency. There was an over-all net loss of funding for training programs.

Analysts of non-Indian War on Poverty programs generally take a different view of the federal programs than did Sorkin. Haveman (1977) wrote that as a result of both planned and unplanned developments, the decade of 1965-75 saw improvements in the economic status of the poor, but that this was overbalanced by negative results of the programs. The programs discouraged work efforts on the part of recipients, encouraged family break-ups, and promoted migration from low- to high-benefit areas. Haveman found that by the end of the period, poverty diminished but income inequality persisted. In sum, Haveman (1977, p. 14) wrote: "When held to generally accepted principles of efficiency and equity, the social policy legacy of the 1965-75 decade does not score well."

Levin (1977) found that on the basis of both investment efficiency and poverty reduction, the Job Corps, MDTA, and JOBS made only slight impact in providing specific job skills and increasing employability.

Almost a decade later, and with the benefit of additional data, Danziger and Weinberg (1986), like Haveman, found that antipoverty programs of the Great Society came to increasingly rely on income transfer, not training, and that "disincentive effects" derive from income transfer in general. They found overall limited gains from education and employment programs.

Bassi and Ashenfelter (1977) reported that CETA programs had greater benefit to minority women, especially young ones. Further, of the four types of CETA programs, work experience was the least effective. The
other three types included classroom training, on-the-job training, and public service and produced positive benefits for women, averaging $600-1,200 gains and no loss of income after the program.

The ICAP programs operated from a very different premise than CETA. ICAP centers were established at four universities to provide technical support, and tribes adopted resolutions to authorize CAP agencies to be designated as Community Action Agencies. Within three years of the establishment of the program in 1964, there were 67 ICAP programs on 170 reservations serving 300,000 people (Levitan & Hetrick, 1971). The innovative feature was that Indians themselves designed the programs and allocated the funds (Bullock et al., 1983).

CETA and the Indian Communities

CETA was a small part of the federal budget for Indian communities, and by no means the most important. The program was administered nationally by the Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of Indian and Native American Programs. In 1978, about 193 Native American organizations received grants (Jones, 1982), and in 1978 the Department of Labor claimed CETA programs reached "...virtually all reservation tribes, most of the non-reservation tribes, the recognized tribes of Oklahoma, the Alaskan Natives, Hawaiian Natives, and the majority of viable urban Indian organizations" (Indian Program Evaluation 1978, p. 130). The Indian CETA program worked directly with American Indian entities with a governing body, a service population of at least 1,000, and the capability to administer a program (Jones, 1982). Smaller tribes formed consortia.

A 1977 report found 14.6% of participants in classroom training, 7.2% in on-the-job training, 5% in public service employment, 50% in work experience, and 24.4% "other," totalling 50,600 people. The report concluded, "What is important is the stress shown by these figures on employment and subsidization rather than formal training" (American Indian Policy Review Commission, 1977, p. 353).

In 1977, expenditures nationwide in Indian communities were budgeted at $52.56 million (Ceta Allocation, 1976); these rose to $113 million by 1981. Of this, $2,317,466 was for the State of Washington (Barsh et al., 1984). By 1980, federal expenditures for CETA in Indian country amounted to $258 per capita (Barsh et al., 1984). Despite the low levels of outlays, the program was important to several small tribes of Washington State, and many others elsewhere (Beckham, personal communication, see note 2).

There were several important implications of the CETA programs in Indian country. First, even though the income gains derived from CETA were small, they were essential to very poor Indian communities with high unemployment rates, and the impact of the new income ramified through the community. Mooney (1976), Miller (1989a), Robbins (1986) and others
have demonstrated the significance of inter-household exchange networks in Coast Salish communities, and the role these play in the well-being of family network members. Guilmet et al. (1989) noted that:

The extended family support system is of ultimate importance to most American Indian...clients. Since informal resources such as the extended family are known to provide emotional support, material assistance, physical care, information referral, and mediation in times of emotional need, a client...who perceives himself/herself as being isolated and without "family" to depend upon and interact with may experience much more difficulty in coping with acute episodes and chronic illness (p. 70).

Families frequently are structured around and actively depend on leadership from members with relatively large and stable incomes who can provide aid to family members. This aid frequently takes the form of balanced reciprocity. For example, small sums of money are provided to family members for important purposes such as keeping a car operating. The favor may be returned by chopping wood or carrying out other useful tasks. Also, family members make loans at strategic times that are returned when the crisis is weathered and can be repaid. In Coast Salish communities this movement of capital through gift or loan may be enough to enable family members to meet the expenses of operating fishing boats or to keep homes heated in the winter. Tribal members who are not members of family networks are often unable to meet emergency or even routine financial needs (Miller, 1989a).

Second, CETA funds in the Indian communities have indirectly served to promote family cohesion, not family break-up, as was found to be a common result of federal assistance programs. In Coast Salish communities with an ethos of communalism (Mooney, 1976), the exchange of goods and services is the glue that binds people together. Coast Salish communities can be viewed as collectivities of family networks, and as will be seen, leaders who trained under the provisions of CETA and other programs have been able to provide benefits to their family network through their membership on the tribal council. Expertise is necessary in order for families to compete effectively with others in the tribe, a success that binds families more closely together. Furthermore, technically able leaders trained under such programs who are members of families too small to run their own candidate are able to mitigate the potential for factionalism in the community by drawing electoral support across family lines, a topic I have treated in detail elsewhere (Miller, 1989a, 1989b).

Third, the income and the skills developed from CETA and other programs have served both directly and indirectly to support family and tribal cohesion through providing the finances necessary for traditional cultural activities, including funerals and winter ceremonials. Mutual support and
participation in ceremonial life is essential to family life among Coast Salish people and quite costly (see Amoss, 1978, for a thorough discussion of ceremonial life among the Nooksack, a Coast Salish tribe, and Suttles, 1987, for a discussion of the importance of ceremonial life to tribal cohesion). Sending a family member through the Seowyrt winter society initiation requires that family members cook sporadically all through the winter for hundreds of guests; money be available to thank trainers, visitors, and guests; and that the families purchase items to give away to guests. The operation of the Indian Shaker Church also creates a significant financial demand on otherwise poor people. CETA employment and subsequent spin-off employment has helped Indian people meet these demands.

Fourth, tribal councilors from tribes all over Puget Sound have commented on the subtle influence of CETA in their communities. Anne Pavel, Skokomish, said of CETA that "Women were ready to take advantage of it, to be trained, and to see it as upward mobility steps. People became more qualified because of the experience" (personal communication, see Note 3). She noted that inter-tribal cooperation was fostered because CETA administrators were required to deal with multi-tribal groups. In response, the small western Washington tribes, varying from several hundred to several thousand in membership, created joint programs to meet the program terms. Experience gained in the inter-tribal ventures was useful in later successfully competing to fund multi-tribal mental health programs, such as, for example, three programs established in 1988; the Bloc grants under the provisions of the 1988 Omnibus Drug and Alcohol Abuse legislation, the Intertribal Displaced Homemaker Program, and the Intertribal Early Childhood Handicap Program. Inter-tribal experience enabled leaders to present an effective, unified position in negotiations with the state and federal government.

Juanita Jefferson, Lummi, remarked that "The War on Poverty programs produced many present tribal leaders" (personal communication, see Note 1). Jefferson refers here to both elective officials who serve on the tribal council and an array of administrators serving tribal needs. Jefferson said further that the critical system of mentoring that has helped advance the careers of tribal leaders of the 1960s crossed tribal lines in part because of the multi-tribal nature of the War on Poverty Programs. Jefferson recalled the help given her in launching an administrative career, started in a ICAP program established at Swinomish, by Laura Wilbur, a Swinomish elder. Help provided in the early days was a hallmark of the careers of many leaders of the 1980s, and has been an important element at several reservations according to leaders such as Maureen Fisher, Upper Skagit, Nancy Wilbur, Swinomish, and Lois Dodson, Nooksack (personal communications, see Note 4). All affirmed that federal money positively influenced the mentoring system.
Case Studies

Three examples illustrate the importance of the War on Poverty programs and the way in which benefits to individual women ramify throughout the community. The case of Jane Jones (a pseudonym), former Health Services Director at Coast Salish Tribe A, illustrates the relationship between tribal leadership and federal funding. Mrs. Jones is a former Tribal Council member and an active participant in Tribe A cultural affairs. Her story is of interest in part because her early upbringing did not prepare her for leadership either in skills or inclination. In fact, she recalled:

*My thoughts when growing up were not to go out and work, just stay in the household and the husband would work at a regular job and provide for the family.... My thoughts have changed over the years.... I never thought about women in the work world or involved in anything (personal communication).*

Mrs. Jones' first full-time job, at Coast Salish Tribe B tribal fish plant, lasted two years; it started in 1970 and was funded by federal money through the Northwest Opportunity Council. Later, she served for 18 months as a clerk-typist at the Tribe A offices under CETA funding. Following this, she used Northwest Opportunity Council funds again to work at the Coast Salish Tribe C Education Center and Community Services. She also served two and a half years in the secretarial pool at Tribe C, again under CETA funding. This particular employment had an important effect on her. While working with tribal social services, she realized that she could make a greater contribution. "This was the starting point in my mind to do more than secretarial" (Miller, personal communication).

After service in the Tribe C Health Services Department, she took a post as executive secretary for the Health Services Department, her first full-time, non-trainee position. Later, 1983-85, after an interruption for child-rearing, and after a BIA funded stint in the Northwest Intertribal Court System, Mrs. Jones began work for the Tribal Health Clinic at Tribe A. This was another turning point, for here she received the advice of her supervisor who was also a Tribal Council member. The supervisor encouraged Mrs. Jones to receive more training and schooling, and subsequently she received an A.A. degree. In 1985 Mrs. Jones was appointed Director of the Tribal Health Clinic.

It was during this period that Mrs. Jones was appointed and then elected to the Tribal Council. It is important to note that while this woman had the talent and initiative to advance, federal funding played a critical role, and enabled her to act on the suggestions of her mentor. Mrs. Jones subsequently oversaw the creation of a series of programs aimed at improving tribal mental health, including the tribal program under provisions of the Omnibus Drug and Alcohol Bill and an Inter-tribal Displaced...
Homemaker program. Furthermore, she contributed to the delivery of health care, including mental health services, in an inter-tribal context through service on the advisory board of the Northwest Service Unit of the IHS. Tribal election data show that Mrs. Jones drew support from her family network and non-family members alike, in large measure due to her ability to bridge the gulf between tribal members and outside agencies responsible for the delivery of services (Miller, 1989b).

A second case is that of Agnes Peters (a pseudonym), Tribe A Council member and tribal administrator. Mrs. Peters comes from a rather different background than Mrs. Jones, but the two are alike in that they provide critical technical skills to the tribe as a whole and have developed an expanded view of the ability of tribal services to affect community mental health. Mrs. Peters grew up in a farming family in the Kent Valley of western Washington. She had significant contact with the non-Indian world early in life, and sold family produce in the Seattle public market at Pike Place. She also lived out of the state while doing factory work in a multi-ethnic environment. After the Boldt decision (U.S. vs. Washington, 1974) gave half the salmon catch to the Indians of Washington State and Tribe A received federal recognition, Mrs. Peters returned to the traditional area of Tribe A to help organize a three-tribe Cooperative Court and then the Northwest Intertribal Court System. Although she had no previous experience in the law, she received legal training provided under federal funding.

In subsequent years Mrs. Peters has served as General Manager of the tribe and has managed the tribal industries, including a fire crew and a box manufacturing operation. Mrs. Peters specialized in the creation of tribal code dealing with the establishment of parenting standards, alcohol and drug abuse prevention, and the provision of mental health services. She has also served as a delegate to the highly successful inter-tribal fisheries management scheme developed following the Boldt decision. Mrs. Peters arranged for mental health counselling for fire crew workers and their families after a traumatic episode in which the crew narrowly avoided death.

Taken as a whole, women who have served on the Tribe A council since its recreation in 1974 as an acknowledged tribe have provided most of the technical expertise available to the tribe through its own membership. While four female leaders have had careers as traditional leaders, that is, as representatives of their own family network and as experts in coalescing and representing public opinion, six others have become technocrats who receive tribal wide support in council elections (Miller, 1989a). All of this second group, the technocrats, have developed their careers in the following pattern: CETA and BIA funding was obtained for training in clerical and technical work; subsequent training and experience gained in the initial employment served as preparation for higher level administrative work; and the experience gave the individual the ability to make important contributions to the community as a whole.
These women have subsequently headed virtually every important division of tribal operations, including the health clinic, tribal enterprises, social services, fisheries, planning, court, housing, and elders programs. Collectively they represent a resource that is of vital importance to the well-being of Tribe A people. None would have been able to make their contribution without the availability of outside funding.

Barbara Johnson (also a pseudonym), a member of Tribe C, got her start in tribal management through War on Poverty funding, especially ICAP. Unlike Jane Jones, she had previous work experience, but Mrs. Johnson's story shows another important dimension of the impact of the federal programs: they served to draw back to the reservation people whose talent could be developed and put to use for the benefit of the tribe. In her own words:

*It made all the difference to be in a program and have job experience and all that training. A lot of us would have melted into societies’ mainstream, into clerical work or work at a big company. A lot of our people would have been drained off. A lot of today’s leaders would have been drained off into the white world without these programs, and there are more jobs in Seattle. Lots of [Tribe C] moved home before the Boldt Decision. They were hearing there was action here, that something was changing. They wanted to get involved (personal communication).*

Johnson was hired in 1964 as the first paid staff member of the Tribe B CAP program. She received her initial training through a consultant provided by the University of Utah, one of five universities providing technical assistance to Indian CAP programs. The Tribe B CAP program was initially awarded $65,000 to provide service to a community of about 400 people. Under the terms of the CAP programs, Indian communities could assign staff to a wide range of tasks of community benefit. Johnson began by carrying out a housing survey and a home improvement program. Later, the CAP staff put a new community facility to use and provided recreation, counseling for school children, an alcohol program, and a community outreach worker. A total of five CAP positions were funded.

In the two-and-a-half years she worked at Tribe B, Johnson benefitted from the exposure to the federal funding system and from contacts with state-level leaders. She next moved to a job at Lummi as an instructor under the Manpower Development and Training Program (MDTP), where she worked for another two-and-a-half years, until 1969. In 1970 she went to work under CETA funding for a three-tribe (Coast Salish Tribes A, C and D) program. Later, she was one of the co-founders of a Community College at Tribe C.

An important consequence of the CAP programs was that a philosophic approach to governance developed, called by Johnson the
"community action approach." A generation of young leaders who began their careers in the CAP program and who were imbued with its approach emerged at Tribe C. As at Tribe A, these leaders have provided important services in community as grant writers, tribal managers, finance directors, members of the education planning board, and book-keepers.

Conclusion

A close examination of the impact of federal War on Poverty funding on Indian reservations of western Washington shows important unintended consequences at the tribal, family network, and personal levels. These programs, especially CETA, have prepared a generation of tribal leaders during an important period of growth of tribal operations. As Hansen (1979) noted: "Since 1964, the Civil Rights Act has provided legal basis for an array of federal programs based on race and ethnicity..." (p. 78). The timing of the federal War on Poverty corresponded with the shift of federal policy from the allocation of money in a manner blind to race and ethnicity to the recognition of race and ethnicity in the funding process. Indians were being asked to reorganize their tribal governments to receive federal funds, and this entailed a long process of developing technical expertise. Simultaneously, young men and women, but especially young women, gained this technical ability through training and work experience funded by the federal government. Roberts (1975) wrote:

In 1964 Congress passed the Equal Opportunity Act. This was a momentous breakthrough in Indian affairs because the act included Indians as its beneficiaries.... For the first time Indians were asked to propose and work out plans for programs.... The Swinomish decided to take advantage of it. In order to qualify for funding they had to generate an administrative superstructure (p. 358).

In later years, the skills these women developed have helped tribes stay competitive for the diminished federal funds. Expertise has become all the more important to small tribes as staffs have shrunk and responsibilities grown (Robbins, 1986; Miller, 1989b).

Salaries received during training periods under CETA and other federal programs helped maintain and foster expensive cultural practices that are essential to family cohesion, individual well-being, ceremonial life, and the work of traditional curers. Traditional practices, such as giving children Indian names and conducting potlatches, and conducting traditional funerals, and winter Smokehouse dances, while never dormant, received a major boost following a quiet period. The revival of Coast Salish culture in the 1960s has been widely noted (Amoss, 1978; Dewhirst, 1976; Miller, 1989b).
The availability of funds on an inter-tribal basis allowed the skills to spread through a mentoring process that crossed tribal boundaries. Eventually this proved helpful in the development of important inter-tribal administrative and social service organizations.

In addition, the federal programs led to the development of technocrats who are able to skillfully mediate between the tribe and outside agencies. Again, the timing of the development of these leaders has been helpful because their ascent in the 1960s corresponds with the federal policy of recognition of tribal sovereignty. CETA funding has been useful in helping terminated tribes of southern Washington state and Oregon to establish tribal operations and to regain recognition (Stephen Beckham, personal communication, see Note 2).

ICAP funding played a role in leadership development as well, although this was intended; in fact, OEO administrators claimed that the program was attracting tribal members back to the reservation, an idea substantiated by Johnson. OEO administrators hoped that the leaders produced would play a role in tribal politics and administration, and with private corporations operating on the reservations (Levitan et al., 1971).

At the individual level, federal funding has helped allowing individual tribal members develop skills to their own advantage and satisfaction and to that of their families.

A final note: at present, several tribes mentioned here, including Tribes A and C, are considering directly administering tribal programs without BIA intervention, under the provisions of PL 93-638. In fact, in mid-1990, one Coast Salish tribe received permission to begin direct administration of its own programs. Tribal leaders are hopeful that this will enable federal dollars to go farther and that tribal programs will serve the community more efficiently. Such a development directly depends on the generation of leaders produced in the 1960s and 1970s.

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Notes

1. Interview with Juanita Jefferson, Lummi, Spring 1990. Juanita Jefferson is a former ICAP employee and member of the Board of Northwest Indian College.

2. Personal communication, Spring 1990, Steven Beckham, Department of History, Lewis and Clark State College. Beckham noted that a former Council Chair of the All Pueblo Council in New Mexico described himself as a "CETA Baby" who learned his skills through the training offered in that program.
3. Interview with Anne Pavel, Skokomish, former Tribal Council member, Summer 1985.


References


